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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 Dean Arnold appeals his conviction for attempting to murder 
a witness, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), and raises various 
challenges to his sentence.  We will reverse Arnold’s attempted 
murder conviction because it was based solely upon evidence that 
the district court should have suppressed.  Although, by 
implication, this error also calls into question Arnold’s 
conviction for witness intimidation, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), we 
conclude that the error was harmless, and will affirm.  We will 
also vacate Arnold's sentence and remand the matter to the 
district court for resentencing. 
 I.  
 Arnold, while working as an armored car courier for Federal 
Armored Express, stole $65,000.  He told his then fiancee, 
Jennifer Kloss, about the theft and showed her a lunch thermos in 
which he had stuffed the stolen money.  Later, Arnold stole an 
additional $15,000 and again told Kloss what he had done.  On 
another occasion, while working as an assistant vault person, 
Arnold stole $400,000 in cash directly from the main vault at 
Federal Armored Express, and again told Jennifer Kloss. 
 Fearing that Kloss would tell the FBI about his crimes, 
Arnold told a few individuals, including Edgardo Ramos and Alex 
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Introcaso, that he would pay someone up to $20,000 to kill Kloss. 
 Introcaso, a private investigator, suspected that Arnold had 
committed the Federal Armored Express thefts.  Seeking a reward, 
Introcaso contacted the FBI to report his suspicions.  He also 
called the FBI to report Arnold’s offer to have Kloss killed.   
 The FBI, using Introcaso as part of a “sting” operation, 
recorded a meeting on March 27, 1995, between Introcaso and 
Arnold at Introcaso’s office.  At this meeting, Introcaso told 
Arnold that he had located a hit man willing to kill Kloss for 
$20,000.  Arnold agreed to meet with the hit man the next day and 
reaffirmed that he had threatened to kill Kloss if she turned him 
in.  
 On March 28, 1995 the government obtained a sealed 
indictment against Arnold charging him with bank theft, money 
laundering and witness intimidation.  The witness intimidation 
charge specifically alleged that Arnold had threatened to kill 
Kloss if she provided information to law enforcement officers 
about the thefts.  That afternoon, Arnold met in Introcaso's 
wired office with undercover officer Louis Tallarico, who was 
posing as a professional hit man.  At this meeting, Arnold 
reasserted that he was serious about having Kloss killed and 
showed Tallarico that he had the $20,000 necessary to pay for it. 
 As Arnold left the meeting, the FBI arrested him and seized the 
$20,000. 
 The government next obtained a superseding indictment 
charging Arnold with the additional count of attempted murder of 
a witness.  At trial, a tape recording made at the March 28 
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meeting with the undercover agent was played to the jury over 
Arnold’s objection.  The tape was the only evidence the 
government submitted with respect to the attempted murder charge. 
  At the sentencing hearing, the district court separated the 
offenses into three groups: (1) the two bank larceny counts 
combined with the witness intimidation count; (2) the money 
laundering counts; and, (3) the attempted killing of a witness 
count.  The base offense level for the attempted killing of a 
witness offense was 28.  Because the offense involved the offer 
of money for the murder, the offense level was increased to 32.  
Based upon a finding that Arnold’s testimony about his entrapment 
defense was “willfully false,” the court increased Arnold's 
offense level two more levels to 34 pursuant to § 3C1.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines. 
 The court also granted the government’s motion for an upward 
departure and increased the total offense level by one to 35.  
The court justified the upward departure on two separate grounds: 
(1) the grouping rules did not adequately punish the defendant in 
this case; and, (2) there was still an outstanding sum of money 
that had not been returned.  With a total offense level of 35, 
the guideline range was 168-210 months imprisonment.  The court 
imposed a 210 month sentence and ordered restitution in the 
amount of $223,569.   
 II. 
 Arnold argues that the government violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by eliciting uncounselled statements 
from him after he had been indicted for threatening to kill 
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Kloss.  Arnold contends that because the sealed indictment had 
been returned against him, his right to counsel had attached for 
the witness intimidation charge, and the government was 
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment from deliberately eliciting 
uncounselled statements about the closely related attempted 
murder offense.  The witness intimidation and attempted murder of 
a witness charges are so closely related, Arnold argues, that 
“the right to counsel for the pending offense [witness 
intimidation] cannot constitutionally be isolated from the 
uncharged offense [attempted murder of a witness].”  Arnold 
insists that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress the tape of his March 28th meeting with the undercover 
agent.  We agree. 
 III. 
 The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaches “at or after the initiation of adversary 
judicial criminal proceedings -- whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”  
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1881-82 
(1972).  Under the Sixth Amendment, the government is prohibited 
from deliberately eliciting incriminating evidence from an 
accused “after he ha[s] been indicted and in the absence of his 
counsel.”  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S.Ct. 
1199, 1203 (1964). 
 The Court has made clear, however, that the Sixth Amendment 
right is “offense specific” and “cannot be invoked once for all 
future prosecutions . . . .”  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 
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175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207 (1991).  Hence, when investigating new 
or ongoing criminal activity for which an accused has not been 
indicted, the government does not violate the Sixth Amendment.  
Id. at 175-176, 111 S.Ct. at 2207-08.  The government may 
interrogate an accused about unrelated, uncharged offenses to 
which the right of counsel has not yet attached.  Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146 (1986).  
Moreover, “[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, 
as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, 
of course, admissible at trial of these offenses.”  Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16, 106 S.Ct. 477, 489 n.16 (1985); 
accord Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1252 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1122 (1995). 
 Two Supreme Court cases establish a limited exception to the 
“offense specific” rule.  In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 
S.Ct. 1232 (1977), the defendant was formally charged with the 
abduction of a little girl.  After being charged with the 
abduction, the police, using a “Christian burial speech” to gain 
the trust of the defendant, elicited from him the location of the 
girl’s body.  The defendant was subsequently charged with murder 
and convicted.  The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the 
murder conviction and in so doing held that the defendant’s 
statements to the police about the location of the body were 
inadmissible in his murder trial. 
 Similarly, in Moulton, supra, Moulton and a co-defendant 
committed burglary but were originally only indicted for theft.  
After the indictment was returned, the co-defendant agreed to 
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cooperate with the police and to attempt to elicit incriminating 
statements from Moulton.  This effort was successful, and the 
incriminating statements made by Moulton to the co-defendant were 
used as the basis for filing burglary and other additional 
charges against Moulton.  Moulton was convicted, but the Supreme 
Court of Maine reversed, finding a violation of Moulton’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  The United States Supreme Court 
affirmed.  Significantly, in affirming the Court reversed both 
the theft and burglary charges, notwithstanding the fact that 
Moulton had not yet been charged with burglary when he made his 
statements to the co-defendant. 
 Relying on Brewer and Moulton, many courts have held that 
once the right to counsel attaches with respect to a charged 
offense, it carries over to “closely related” but uncharged 
crimes.1  The reasoning underlying this exception is consistent 
with the purposes and protections of the Sixth Amendment.  When 
the pending charge is “so inextricably intertwined” with the 
charge under investigation “the right to counsel for the pending 
charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to 
                     
     
1
 See, e.g., United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 
1993) (recognizing but not applying the exception), cert. denied, 
114 S.Ct. 1629 (1994); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104 
(9th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 
740-41 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 927 (1992); 
United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(same); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 
1991) (same), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 975 (1992); United States v. 
Michteltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying 
the exception); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ill. 
1988) (same); State v. Tucker, 645 A.2d 111, 120-25 (N.J. 1994) 
(recognizing but not applying the exception), cert. denied, 115 
S.Ct. 751 (1995); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1008-11 (Pa. 1992) 
(applying the exception).  
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counsel for the uncharged offense.”  Hines, 963 F.2d at 257; see 
also Cooper, 949 F.2d at 743.  “[T]o hold otherwise[] would allow 
the [government] to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel merely by charging a defendant with additional related 
crimes” after questioning him without counsel present.  In re 
Pack, 616 A.2d at 1011.    
 In a scholarly opinion we find instructive, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals extensively analyzed the “closely related” 
exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth 
Amendment in Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223 (Md. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1021 (1996).  Collecting cases, the Whittlesey 
Court identified two lines of decisions that had emerged from 
courts considering the exception.  In the first line of 
decisions, courts invoke the exception where (1) the offenses are 
“closely related,” construing that phrase relatively broadly, and 
(2) there is evidence of deliberate police misconduct in the 
process of eliciting the incriminating statements.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(remanding to determine whether state prosecutors had 
deliberately dropped charges against the defendant to facilitate 
a federal investigation of the same conduct); Mitcheltree, 940 
F.2d at 1329 (reversing witness tampering conviction where the 
government exploited a contact between the defendant, who was 
indicted for a drug offense, and a government witness, to acquire 
evidence for both the drug prosecution and a tampering charge 
related to the contact with the witness). 
 In the second line of decisions examined by the Whittlesey 
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court, the focus is entirely on whether the facts underlying the 
charged and uncharged offenses are either “closely related” or 
“inextricably intertwined”; two terms which we take to mean the 
same thing.  In these opinions, the unifying theme is that the 
right to counsel will carry over from the pending charge to the 
new charge only where the new charge arises from the same acts 
and factual predicates on which the pending charges were based.  
Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 235 (citations omitted).  In determining 
whether the same acts and factual predicates underlie both the 
pending and the new charges, courts have looked for similarities 
of time, place, person and conduct.  See, e.g., Kidd, 12 F.3d at 
33; Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-58; Vasquez, 974 F.2d at 1104-05; 
Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740-41.   
 It is undisputed that before Arnold's arrest he retained an 
attorney to represent him in connection with the government’s 
ongoing investigation into the bank larcenies.  It is also 
undisputed that Arnold’s attorney advised the government that he 
was representing Arnold and that Arnold should not be questioned 
in his absence.  Because Arnold’s right to counsel for the 
larceny, laundering and witness intimidation charges attached on 
the morning of March 28, 1995, when the sealed indictment on 
these charges was returned, the issue is whether Arnold’s right 
to counsel carried over to the March 28, 1995 “sting” operation 
and the subsequent indictment for the attempted murder.  We have 
not decided whether to recognize the “closely related” exception 
to the offense specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment.  This 
case requires that we now do so.   
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 Arnold argues that both offenses involved the same witness 
and arise out of precisely the same facts and circumstances -- 
namely, Arnold’s thefts and the threat that Kloss, as a potential 
witness, posed to him.  Most importantly, from Arnold’s 
perspective, is the idea that his attempt to hire a hit man 
strongly indicates that he threatened Kloss earlier and that the 
threats were made to silence a potential witness, thereby 
establishing a common base of evidence from which the charges of 
attempted murder and witness intimidation arose.  Finally, Arnold 
correctly notes that the government’s failure to have sufficient 
evidence to indict him on the attempted murder charge before the 
March 28 “sting” cannot justify violating his Sixth Amendment 
rights to gather the evidence necessary to support an indictment 
for attempted murder. 
 We adopt the "closely related" exception and hold that it 
applies here.  Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the 
witness intimidation and attempted murder of a witness offenses 
could be any more closely related.  As the record shows, both 
charges: (1) involve the same witness; (2) arise from the same 
facts and circumstances; (3) are closely related in time; and, 
(4) involve conduct related to Arnold’s attempt to prevent 
Jennifer Kloss from cooperating with federal authorities 
concerning his crimes.   
 More specifically, the indictment for the witness 
intimidation count explicitly charges that Arnold had threatened 
to kill Jennifer Kloss if she told the authorities about his 
crimes.  This charge involved precisely the same type of 
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underlying conduct as the attempted murder charge -- violent 
action taken to impede a witness's participation in or 
cooperation with a federal criminal investigation.  Given that 
Arnold’s central purpose and the intended results of both 
offenses were the same, we cannot but conclude that the two 
offenses were sufficiently related for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment exception.  Moreover, the crimes Arnold sought to 
conceal by the murder he attempted were the same crimes that 
motivated his acts of intimidation.  Indeed, as the government 
concedes, it was Arnold’s threats to kill Kloss if she disclosed 
his crimes to the federal authorities that served as the impetus 
for the March 28 “sting” operation.  
 In sum, we are persuaded that Arnold’s witness intimidation 
and attempted murder of a witness were closely related offenses 
and arose from the same predicate facts, conduct, intent and 
circumstances.  As a result, we hold that Arnold’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, which attached to the witness 
intimidation charge on the morning of March 28 when he was 
indicted, carried over to the attempted murder of a witness 
charge.  Consequently, the incriminating statements elicited from 
Arnold during the “sting” operation on the afternoon of March 28 
were obtained in violation of Arnold’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, and the district court erred by failing to suppress the 
tape recording.  Because the “sting” operation tape was the only 
evidence against Arnold on the attempted murder charge, the 
court’s error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we will vacate 
Arnold’s conviction for attempted murder of a witness, and remand 
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the matter to the district court either for retrial or for the 
charge to be dismissed.2 
 IV. 
 Arnold also asserts that the district court erred by 
enhancing his base offense level two points for perjury under 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  Section 3C1.1 of the U.S.S.G. provides that 
“[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted 
to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, 
increase the offense level by 2 levels.”  The Guidelines 
expressly include perjury as conduct to which this enhancement 
applies.  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 3(b); United States 
v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 92-93, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1115-16 (1993). 
  In applying this enhancement, Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1 states: 
This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the 
exercise of a constitutional right.  A defendant’s denial of 
guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that 
constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide 
information to a probation officer, or refusal to enter a 
plea of guilty is not a basis for application of this 
provision.  In applying this provision in respect to alleged 
false testimony or statements by the defendant, such 
testimony or statements should be evaluated in a light most 
favorable to the defendant (emphasis added). 
 
                     
 2
 This decision calls Arnold's conviction for witness 
intimidation into question.  Both parties admit that a limiting 
instruction for the use of the March 28 tape recording was 
neither requested nor given.  We conclude, nonetheless, that the 
improper admission of the March 28 tape recording, even without a 
limiting instruction, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The evidence against Arnold with respect to the intimidation 
charge was overwhelming.  Therefore, we will affirm Arnold's 
witness intimidation conviction. 
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 The record shows that at Arnold’s post-trial motion for 
acquittal, the district court independently reviewed the trial 
testimony.  It did not believe Arnold’s claim that threatening 
gestures were made toward him during the conversations recorded 
on March 27 and 28, and therefore his request that Jennifer Kloss 
be killed was made involuntarily.  To support its conclusion, the 
court stated for the record that “[i]t was obvious from the voice 
timbre and content of the tape recordings that this claim was not 
only absurd, it was willfully false.”   
 In addition, the court also reviewed the testimony of a 
defense witness, Herbert Truhe, who testified that Introcaso was 
responsible for Arnold’s plan to have Jennifer Kloss killed.  The 
court concluded that “Herbert Truhe’s testimony was highly 
improbable in view of the content of the tape recordings and the 
jury resolved the conflicting testimony in favor of the 
government.”  Finally, the court also noted that both Jennifer 
Kloss and Edgardo Ramos testified about Arnold’s threats and 
attempts to silence Jennifer Kloss. 
 At Arnold’s sentencing hearing, the court reaffirmed its 
decision to apply the obstruction of justice enhancement to 
Arnold’s sentence by noting that it had already made a finding 
that Arnold’s testimony had been “willfully false.”  Arnold 
argues that the court erred because it viewed the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government during the post-trial 
motion.  Arnold contends that under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, the court 
was required to make an independent finding whether he had 
committed perjury, and in doing so was required to view the 
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evidence in a light most favorable to him, and under a clear and 
convincing standard. 
 Courts of Appeals in other circuits have reached various 
conclusions on this issue.  Three courts interpret Application 
Note 1 to Section 3C1.1 to require a higher standard of proof 
than mere preponderance of the evidence.  United States v. 
Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (clear-and-
convincing); United States v. Onumonu, 999 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 
1993) (clear-and-convincing); United States v. Willis, 940 F.2d 
1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[n]o enhancement should be imposed 
based on the defendant's testimony if a reasonable trier of fact 
could find the testimony true"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 
(1993).   
 As the Court of Appeals explained in Montague, 40 F.3d at 
1254, "[W]e must assume that, in writing the Application Note to 
section 3C1.1, the Sentencing Commission intended to create an 
exception to the usual practice of employing the preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard in sentencing decisions."  In practice, 
the application of a higher standard of proof in a § 3C1.1 
perjury enhancement requires that “the fact finder give the 
benefit of the doubt to the defendant . . . and find perjury only 
on evidence with respect to which the judge is clearly 
convinced.”  Id. at 1255.   
 Other courts interpret this to require little more than 
"simply instruct[ing] the sentencing judge to resolve in favor of 
the defendant those conflicts about which the judge, after 
weighing the evidence, has no firm conviction."  United States v. 
  
 
 15 
Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 1989); accord United 
States v. Barbarosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 961 (1990).  Other courts have applied the 
standard a bit differently.  United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 506, 
510 (1st Cir.) (". . . [A]mbiguities that plausibly suggest that 
the testimony or statements were innocent as opposed to 
obstructive . . . may have to be resolved in favor of the 
innocent reading."), cert. denied, 1996 WL 514207; United States 
v. Zajac, 62 F.3d 145, 150-51 (6th Cir.) (“firm conviction”), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 681 (1995). 
 We have never directly decided the question, commenting only 
generally on the issue in United States v. Colletti, 984 F.2d 
1339, 1348 (3d Cir. 1992).  In Colletti, a pre-Dunnigan case 
challenging section 3C1.1 as unconstitutional, we stated: 
In our view, in order to warrant the two point enhancement for 
obstruction of justice, the perjury of the defendant must 
not only be clearly established, and supported by evidence 
other than the jury's having disbelieved him, but also must 
be sufficiently far-reaching as to impose some incremental 
burdens upon the government, either in investigation or 
proof, which would not have been necessary but for the 
perjury. 
 
Colletti does not provide a clear indication of the specific 
burden of proof to be applied.  Nonetheless, its “clearly 
established” requirement counsels toward a standard of proof 
higher than a mere preponderance. 
 We are persuaded that the Application Note intends a higher 
standard than a preponderance of evidence.  We hold that the 
Application Note’s command to evaluate a defendant’s alleged 
false testimony or statements “in a light most favorable to the 
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defendant,” requires the sentencing court to refrain from 
imposing a § 3C1.1 enhancement unless, in weighing the evidence, 
it is clearly convinced that it is more likely than not that the 
defendant has been untruthful. 
 Here, it is unclear what standard of proof the district 
court used when reaching its determination that Arnold had 
committed perjury.  Moreover, because there is no indication in 
the record that the district judge, when relying on his earlier 
finding, placed the burden of proof upon the government and 
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Arnold, we 
conclude that the district judge’s decision that Arnold committed 
perjury did not meet the requirements of § 3C1.1.  Accordingly, 
we will vacate Arnold’s sentence and remand the matter to the 
district court for resentencing.  On remand, the district court 
must use the clear and convincing standard, place the burden of 
proof upon the government, and support its decision with the 
findings required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunnigan.3  
 V. 
 The defendant raises three other sentencing issues.  We can 
                     
 3
 Judge Roth does not believe that the "clear and 
convincing" standard is applicable here.  In her opinion, the 
language of Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides a 
sufficiently stringent basis to determine whether the enhancement 
is appropriate using a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 
 The adoption of a "clearly convincing" standard is not helpful 
to district court judges who must keep in mind a growing list of 
different standards of proof to apply in sentencing proceedings. 
 Because the district judge did not, however, indicate that 
his determination of "willfully false" was made in a light most 
favorable to the defendant, Judge Roth agrees it is necessary to 
remand on the issue of the enhancement for obstruction of 
justice. 
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dispose of them briefly.  
 Arnold contends that the district court erred by its upward 
departure because there was nothing “unusual or extraordinary” 
about his crimes that would warrant a departure from the 
Guidelines.  We need not decide the merits of Arnold’s contention 
because the district court must now recalculate Arnold’s 
sentence.  As such, the application of the grouping rules under § 
3D1.4 of the Guidelines will change, rendering Arnold's upward 
departure issue moot.     
 Second, Arnold argues that the district court failed to make 
the proper findings that he had the ability to pay restitution.  
The government concedes error, and we agree.  See United States 
v. Copple, 74 F.3d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1996).  Therefore, we will 
vacate the restitution order and remand the matter for the 
district court to find whether Arnold is able to pay restitution. 
    Finally, Arnold contends that the district court erred by 
delegating the timing and the amount of his restitution payments 
to his probation officer.  The government again concedes error, 
and again we agree.  See United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 
356 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1286 (1996).  Hence, 
on remand the district court itself must determine both the 
timing and the amount of the restitution payments.  
 VI. 
 In summary, we will reverse Arnold's conviction for 
attempted murder, affirm his conviction for witness intimidation, 
vacate his sentence, and remand the matter to the district court 
for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
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